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Absent minded people are not under the control of task-relevant stimuli. According
to the Neuroenergetics Theory of attention (NeT), this lack of control is often due to
fatigue of the relevant processing units in the brain caused by insufficient resupply of
the neuron’s preferred fuel, lactate, from nearby astrocytes. A simple drift model of
information processing accounts for response-time statistics in a paradigm often used
to study inattention, the Sustained Attention to Response Task (SART). It is suggested
that errors and slowing in this fast-paced, response-engaging task may have little to due
with inattention. Slower-paced and less response-demanding tasks give greater license
for inattention—aka absent-mindedness, mind-wandering. The basic NeT is therefore
extended with an ancillary model of attentional drift and recapture. This Markov model,
called NEMA, assumes probability λ of lapses of attention from 1 s to the next, and
probability α of drifting back to the attentional state. These parameters measure the
strength of attraction back to the task (α), or away to competing mental states or action
patterns (λ); their proportion determines the probability of the individual being inattentive
at any point in time over the long run. Their values are affected by the fatigue of the brain
units they traffic between. The deployment of the model is demonstrated with a data set
involving paced responding.
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INTRODUCTION
The enduring stereotype of the absent-minded professor speaks
both to the abstraction of his profession and to its diffuse impact
on the common weal. The absent-minded neurosurgeon and the
absent-minded airplane pilot are sooner terminated, by ethical
panels or by mountain ranges. In all cases absentmindedness
is seen as a fault, one whose gravity depends on the impor-
tance and delicacy of the task left unattended. Fantasy, daydreams
and night-dreams are mind wandering at its purest, typically
let manifest in secure environments of easy chair or bed. It is
only when the mind is absent from a high-priority task with-
out leave that its owner may incur sanctions. Why does the mind
go AWOL?
In their seminal paper The Restless Mind, Smallwood and
Schooler (2006), argue that mind wandering is due to the hijack-
ing of attention away from the primary task by an alternative
goal that becomes activated without meta-awareness. Once inter-
rupted, attention to the primary task is delayed or forgotten.
Much mischief may issue from restless minds, ranging from
neglect of desired or essential actions, to inappropriate displace-
ment of those actions by other actions—slips. Slips may be verbal
(Freud, 1966), musical (Palmer and Van De Sande, 1993), or
non-acoustic actions (Norman, 1981). They are commonplace
(Cheyne et al., 2006), more so under conditions of fatigue or
emotion, when more common behavioral trajectories intersect
with less common ones (Heckhausen and Beckmann, 1990),
and in special populations (Robertson et al., 1997). Hypnosis
subverts meta-awareness, giving the hypnotist control over the
direction in which the mind will wander, and the actions that
will ensue (Hilgard, 1992; Woody et al., 1992; Killeen and Nash,
2003).
This article addresses, not where the mind goes when it is
absent, but why it leaves. In particular, it proposes that in many
cases, it is not that the mind is attracted toward other thoughts
and actions, but rather that it flees from a difficult task. The
task may be difficult because of fatigue or boredom—not in
general terms, but in particular ones. One population that is espe-
cially susceptible to absent-mindedness is that of individuals with
attention deficit disorder (ADHD, Inattentive and Combined
subtypes). A recent theoretical treatment of that condition is
introduced and applied to the general case of absent-mindedness.
A NEUROENERGETICS THEORY OF ATTENTION (NeT)
Todd and Botteron (2001) hypothesized that ADHD might be
due, not to a dopaminergic disorder, the contemporary and
still regnant hypothesis, but rather to catecholamine-mediated
hypofunctionality of astrocyte glucose and glycogen metabolism.
Glial cells, which the brain contains in numbers about equal to
that of neurons, surround the neurons. Some form the myelin
sheath that makes neuroconduction much faster and more effi-
cient. Others, the astrocytes, take up glucose from the capillaries
and convert it to glycogen and lactate. Upon stimulation, the
astrocytes release the lactate into the extracellular space, which
the neurons can take up, and in turn convert to ATP, which
fuels the many processes involved in signaling and reestablish-
ment of gradients. Todd and Botteron hypothesized that reduced
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catecholaminergic input leads to a decrease in astrocyte-mediated
neuronal energy metabolism and impaired frontal-cortex func-
tion in ADHD. Russell et al. (2006) took that hypothesis a step
further, and addressed a specific aspect of the clinical presenta-
tion, moment-to-moment fluctuations in task performance that
are often manifest in behavior of clinical populations, and refined
and extended the biochemical bases underlying the hypoener-
getic thesis. They hypothesized that in the case of ADHD both
the oligiodendrocytes—the white matter of the brain that insu-
lates the neurons—and also the astrocyte-neuron lactate shut-
tle that transported the energy from astrocyte to neuron, were
compromised.
The latest step in this investigation has been the refinement
of the energetic hypothesis based on our quickly accruing under-
standing of the neurochemical bases of this complex system
(Bélanger et al., 2011; Jakoby et al., 2012), and the development
of amathematical model that carries the energetic hypothesis into
direct contact with behavioral data (Killeen et al., 2013).
FUEL AND FATIGUE
Paying attention is an effortful process (Kahneman, 1973; Sarter
et al., 2006). The effort involves the creation and transmission
of action potentials, postsynaptic potentials, and the resetting
of ion gradients, which are all energy-intense, yet essential for
information transmission (Attwell and Gibb, 2005; Strelnikov,
2010; Howarth et al., 2012). The energy is initially provided
by mitochondrial respiration, and subsequently by glial (astro-
cyte) processes (Mangia et al., 2003). The latter are triggered
by the glutamate released by neurons, which is taken up by
the astrocytes, powered by sodium influx. The ATP used to
re-establish the sodium gradient stimulates the conversion of
glycogen (glycogenolysis), which restores the ATP and also gener-
ates lactate (Kasischke et al., 2004; Hyder et al., 2006). Astrocytes’
recruitment of energy from their glycogen stores (Benarroch,
2010) is facilitated by noradrenergic stimulation of the astrocytes’
β-adrenoceptors (Fillenz et al., 1999; Hertz et al., 2010). Lactate is
transported to the interstitial space, where it is incorporated and
used by neurons as their preferred energy source (Pellerin et al.,
2007). Insufficient supplies of glucose or lactate impair the release
of glutamate from presynaptic terminals (Magistretti, 2009). The
basic fuel stock for these processes is glucose, whose uptake is ulti-
mately reflected in the BOLD signals sensed by fMRI (Engstrom
et al., 2013).
The energy transport system in the brain is much more com-
plicated than indicated by the above summary (Cloutier et al.,
2009). The key point is that the brain, comprising only 2% of the
body’s weight, utilizes 25% of total glucose production for per-
ception, attention, and response generation (Zhang and Raichle,
2010). An insufficiency in any of the links in the supply chain will
slow information processing. One of the key buffers for energy
deployment, the glycogen stores of the astrocytes, takes hours to
replete, and that process is inhibited by noradrenergic stimula-
tion concomitant to neural activity. Functional units in the brain
will deplete energetic resources in their neurons over the course
of a dozen seconds, and will draw down resources from the astro-
cytes over the course of dozens of minutes. This fatigue of those
units slows their responsiveness, and increases the difficulty in
engaging, or reengaging them. According to this hypothesis, ener-
getic insufficiency is the main cause of inattention, distractibility
and mind wandering—all of which constitute an escape to less
fatigued functional units.
RESPONSE GENERATION: THE NeT
The hundreds of thousands of neural events associated with a sin-
gle response may be thought of as a tug of war between excitatory
and inhibitory forces, with the drift toward the execution of the
response a drunkards walk along the line. If a criterion distance
of C = 75 units is set, the probability of a step in the positive
direction is 2/3, and in the negative direction 1/3, and a step is
made everymillisecond, we get the trajectories shown in Figure 1.
In some cases, the first hitting time at C = 75 is fast—100ms;
and in some cases slow—over 400ms. If we redo the simulations
thousands of times, and plot the proportion of times the crite-
rion is crossed as a function of the total number of time-steps,
the curve at the top results. It is the special case of the inverse
Gaussian distribution (Chhikara and Folks, 1989) called the Wald
distribution, given by:




2t t > 0 (1)
C is the criterion, t time (here in ms), and v is the net velocity in
steps per millisecond.
FIGURE 1 | Nine trajectories of random walks, with the probability of a
step North twice the probability of a step South. The distribution of
times the trajectories cross the criterion C = 75 for the first time is given by
the Wald density shown in the top panel.
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The mean of Eq. (1) is m = C/v, its standard deviation
(C/v3)1/2, and its coefficient of variation is therefore (Cv)−1/2.
The Wald is a skewed distribution with a coefficient of skewness
equal to 3(Cv)−1/2. These statistics are heavily dependent on the
speed of propagation: Halving the velocity v doubles the mean,
and more than doubles the standard deviation. This explains why
variability is more diagnostic of slowed neural processing speed
than are means in various experimental and clinical conditions.
The primary assumption of this Neuroenergetics Theory of
attention (NeT) is that focused attention to stimuli, especially to
simple unvarying stimuli, fatigues the relevant functional units
in the brain, and slows the processing speed, v. Different tasks
require more or fewer computations (C), and these may dif-
fer among individuals and populations. In order to maintain a
minimal response speed, individuals may sacrifice accuracy by
decreasing the criterion for a response; this is often the case when
task complexity is increased without increasing time allowed
for the task. In the original development (Killeen et al., 2013)
the velocity of neural propagation, v, was identified with the
energy available for a response, E. That interpretation remains,
but the equation is not necessary for present purposes, and so the
parameter is kept closer to its origin.
Some experimental paradigms require the occasional inhibi-
tion of a response, either by presenting a rare non-target, or by
presenting a supervening stop signal. It requires a finite time,
Tstop, to abort an initiated response. In the case of Figure 1,
if Tstop is 150ms, some fast trajectories will have completed
before they can be aborted. These are often counted as errors of
commission, or false positives.
Computation of these parameters is straightforward given
the response-time distributions; but those are seldom given.
Therefore, it is necessary to impute those parameters from known
statistics of the distributions. Given the mean (μ) and standard
deviation (σ) of the data, then:
v = √μ/σ (2)
C = μv (3)
This model tells only part of the story, a part that is relevant to
a fast-paced environment where individuals do not “space-out”
for long. If there are any microstates of inattention in this model
(Cheyne et al., 2006), they will manifest as slow trajectories of the
regular Wald distribution. Frank lapses of attention are treated
in the next section. But now it is reasonable to try some worked
examples.
APPLICATION OF THE NeT
The SART is a popular measure of sustained attention (Smilek
et al., 2010), with the originating article (Robertson et al., 1997)
being cited over 600 times, often by other users of the procedure.
The SART reverses the more common GO/NOGO vigilance pro-
cedure by requiring repeated responding (key presses) to a series
of digits, and withholding responding when one of the 9 dig-
its, typically “3”, appears. Subjects are usually told to respond as
quickly as possible while maintaining high accuracy.
It is rare for researchers to report intra-subject variability,
which is necessary to engage NeT. Of those that do, many fail to
also report mean response times, or do it in normalized form; or
substitute p-values for the data. One study that reported both first
and second moments of the response distributions (Braet et al.,
2009) was focused on the analysis of fMRI images, but provided
statistics for the SART for 20 young adults and 20 young adoles-
cents. The use of Eq. (2) permits us to recode arbitrary statistics
into the variables of interest (assigning values for σ = cvμ, where
cv is the reported coefficient of variation).
Table 1 shows that the inferred speed of computation, v, was
greater for adults, a common finding. The criterion C was also
larger for adults, reflecting less impulsivity in making a response.
This moved their distribution to the right. If it took 440ms
for both groups to abort a response (Tstop), then the inferred
percentage of false positives is close to that measured by these
investigators.
Such results were replicated by Carriere et al. (2010), who col-
lected similar data on individuals ranging in age from 14 to 77.
Through the lens of NeT, their data showed that available energy
for responding increased to a peak in the fourth decade, and
decreased thereafter; C increased monotonically with age.
This study demonstrates the deployment of NeT, illustrating
how it may be used to extract variables of interest from summary
statistics. But a better exercise of the model is found in the data
reported by Seli et al. (2012a). They used a standard SART design,
but reported data from the first and second half of the session. In
the first study, they had standard (equal emphasis on speed and
accuracy) instructions, and a second group instructed to go slowly
to improve accuracy (within the constraints of fast-paced tri-
als). A second study replicated the first, and added periodic alerts
intended to call the subjects to attention to the task (remind-
ing them to “try and be very aware of what you are doing in
the task.”). All conditions employed 30 college students in each.
NeT predicts a decrease in energy available, and thus speed of
computation, going from the first to second half, and increased
criteria for the “go-slow” group (down triangles). Figure 2
shows the values imputed to these indices, which sustain the
predictions.
Figure 2 also shows that there was a decrease in the criterion
in the second half of the trials. If these were self-paced trials,
the criteria may have remained constant, or increased to per-
mit the same levels of accuracy in first and second halves. But,
for both standard and “go-slow” instructions, the subjects had
only 1 s in which to respond before the next stimulus appeared.
The decreased criteria in the second half, when processing speeds
were slower, may have been a strategy to avoid errors of omission,
which were rare. Other investigators using the SART (e.g., McVay
and Kane, 2009) also report a degradation in performance as a
function of time through task, validating that basic prediction of
NeT.
Table 1 | Application of Eq. (2) to the data of Braet et al. (2009).
μ (ms) Coef. Var. FP (%) C v FP (% pred.)
GROUP
Adults 550 0.19 12 123 0.223 14
Adolescents 520 0.26 32 88 0.169 30
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By increasing their criteria for a response, subjects in the
“go-slow” conditions succeeded in reducing the false-positive
responses: All six of the data points in the lower part of the lower
panel come from that condition (one of those points lies hid-
den behind another in this graph). Assuming that it required
Tstop = 343ms to abort a response, we predict that the propor-
tion of erroneous “go” responses shown on the x-axis of that panel
that would have slipped through before they could be counter-
manded. This analysis requires that forced slowing of responding
FIGURE 2 | Top Panel: Summary statistics from two experiments using the
SART (Seli et al., 2012a) entail these values for criterion (C) and speed of
computation (v). Fatigue of functional units, here involving the brain circuits
used for discrimination of the symbol “3”, is manifest by lower values of v
in the second half of all experiments. The triangles denote standard
instructions, and the inverted triangles “go-slow” instructions. Filled
symbols are from the conditions with distracting audio alerts. Bottom
panel: Assuming a value of Tstop = 343ms predicts the probability of failing
to abort a response on the no-go trials, as shown on the x-axis; the y-axis
gives the obtained probabilities.
must reduce errors in this task, which has been demonstrated (Seli
et al., 2012b).
ATTENTION LOSS AND RECAPTURE
There is nothing in the above analysis that suggests lapses of
attention. At most, one sees slowing speed of neural computa-
tions as a function of time on task, reflected in decreases in v;
and changes in the criterial number of computations, indexed by
C, as a function of task difficulty, temporal constraint, instruc-
tions, speed/accuracy tradeoffs, and population (i.e., age, DSM
category, etc). The SART is too fast paced to abide gross lapses of
attention and mind wandering. But a more slowly-paced, more
boring task might do so. Such an experiment was reported by
Leth-Steensen et al. (2000), who analyzed data from a study that
presented four empty circles on a computer screen, initiating a
fore-period of 2, 4, or 8 s. At the end of that wait, one of the cir-
cles was colored-in, and the participant had to press of one of four
corresponding keys. There followed an inter-trial interval of 2.5 s,
and then the next set of empty circles. The experiment lasted up
to 3 h. The results from two of the groups analyzed, 17 boys with
ADHD and 18 age-matched controls, are presented on the x-axis
of Figure 3.
There was a marked increase in mean and variance of response
times as the waiting period increased. Although Eq. (1) could be
fit to those data, it does not make sense for NeT to do that, as
there is no principled reason for expecting radical slowing and
increasing variance of neural processing over these relatively short
intervals, which occurred in randomized blocks through the ses-
sion. Therefore the model was expanded to include the separate
process of attentional lapses, as shown in Figure 4.
FIGURE 3 | The mean and standard deviations from a slow choice task
(Leth-Steensen et al., 2000) are arrayed on the x-axis. Children with
ADHD are shown as triangles, controls as circles; filled symbols are means,
unfilled standard deviations. Within clusters, the longer fore-periods had
monotonically increasing values. The y-axis gives the values extracted from
the model shown in Figure 4, using the parameters given in Table 2.
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FIGURE 4 | Trials start the participant in the attentive (A) state;
responses triggered by a target when in that state ensue according to
Eq. (1). But there is a probability λ of attentional lapses from 1s to the
next, moving the participant to the inattentive state (∼A). Responses
triggered by a target from that inattentive state return attention to the task
with probability α, and responses then ensue according to Eq. (1). If there is
no target presentation, as is often the case in mind wandering and for
non-experimental settings, attention will drift back slowly, with probability α
much lower than when stimulated to do so by a conspicuous target.
This Neuroenergetics ofMaintained Attention (NEMA)model
is usefully simplified for two different contexts: Stimulus-driven
recapture and goal-driven recapture. In the first case, involv-
ing experimental procedures with conspicuous stimuli, set the
probability of recovery of attention (α; alpha) to 0 until a tar-
get presentation, and thereafter to a value close to 1. This results
in a “double” exponential process: an exponentially increasing
probability of lapsing attention as the trial progresses; and then
an exponentially distributed delay to recapture. This is the case
used for analysis of laboratory paradigms in general. The case
of goal driven attention, the more general scenario for absent-
mindedness and for detection of inconspicuous stimuli, is treated
in Section 3.4.
The predictions for this model are those for the Wald, with
additional time and variance added due to the probabilistic lapse
of attention and its recovery:
μ = C/v + (1 − p(A))τ (4)
σ2 = C/v3 + (1 − p(A))τ2 (5)
The probability of being in the attentional state decreases as
p(A) = (1 − λ)t , where t is time through trial in seconds. τ (tau)
is the mean of the exponentially distributed return time cor-
responding to α. The resulting distributions are a mixture of
Wald and ex-Wald (Schwarz, 2001), with first two moments as
given above. An implication of this model is that mind wan-
dering will increase as the pace of the task decreases, and as its
duration increases. Another is that frequent sojourns through the
Table 2 | Parameters for the data from Leth-Steensen et al. (2000).
C v λ τ (s)
GROUP
ADHD 79 0.104 0.108 0.43
Controls 115 0.194 0.091 0.19
inattentive state will greatly increase variance in performance (Eq.
5), which has been shown to be the case (Seli et al., 2013).
With this attentional model, and the parameters given in
Table 2, the predictions for the data reported by Leth-Steensen
et al. (2000) are arrayed on the y- axis of Figure 3. The imputed
probability of inattention increased from around 22% in the 2 s
conditions to around 60% in the 8 s conditions.
Whereas the accurate prediction of 12 data-points using a
model with 8 parameters may not impress, the model is princi-
pled, and the parameter values throw light on the populations
studied. The ADHD group had substantially less energy avail-
able (v), as expected, and thus their speeds of computation v were
much less than for controls (see Table 2). Controls were able to
make substantially more computations, as evidenced by the values
ofC. The probabilities of attentional lapse (λ; lambda) were about
the same, but it took the ADHD group much longer to return to
attention (τ).
When speed of processing is compromised, as in ADHD, this
seriously impacts working memory, which requires quick pro-
cessing to operate on information while maintain the availability
of other information. Conversely, individuals with limited work-
ing memory capacity (WMC) are more likely to mind-wander
(Kane and McVay, 2012). NeT claims that both limitations on
WMC and mind wandering are caused by limitations of energetic
resupply to focal neural groups.
A MIND ADRIFT
Successful present-mindedness entails sensitivity to stimuli that
guide behavior at choice-points. Who among us has never left
the house only to have to return to it for keys, or eyeglasses, or
phone, or lunch, or papers? A common algorithm to cope with
such absent-mindedness is to set the item, or a sign of it, near
the risky choice points. “If you cannot remember,” you can hear
your mother saying, “set reminders”! Memoranda and to-do lists
do not improve our memory, but rather obviate the need for it. A
lazier and less-successful tactic is to make a mental note: “when I
get to the back door I must check to be sure that I havemy books”.
There is a growing literature on “prospective memory,” remem-
bering to do something at some point in time or in the presence of
some stimulus, such as leaving for home at 3:30 today, and pick-
ing up some milk when driving past the grocery. Failure of the
cues to elicit the uncommon temporal or physical detour indi-
cates stronger control of behavioral trajectories by habits than by
intentions. If you are interested in knowing more about prospec-
tive memory, do not make a point of remembering to check it
out—Google-Scholar it now, and drag the URL to your desktop;
your mother would be proud.
The practice of meditation gives one immediate witness to
one’s own inability to hold attention steadfast. A meditator
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attempts to keep his mind empty; or filled only with one object—
breathing, or a mantra, or an object of devotion. This is impos-
sible to maintain for long, as the mind goes delinquent almost
immediately. This is not a problem for successful meditators, as
their art is to bring it bring it back on topic; again and again
and again. And with practice, the increasing periods of success
are deeply quieting and gratifying.
Figure 4 provides a model of this process; but now there are no
extrinsic targets being presented to refocus attention (or they are
brief or inconspicuous). In the case of the meditator, the A state is
correct focus on intended image, and the ∼A state is attention to
other ideas. In the case of the absent minded-professor, the A state
is attention to, and sensitivity to, the cues at choice-points in the
world around him; the ∼A state is control by the momentum of
habit, or by internal dialogs that must share attention with getting
out the door. Upon starting meditation, the meditator is in the A
state; and again there on returning a vagrant mind to the object of
attention. Upon being charged with his task, the professor is in the
A state; he makes a mental note to pick up the laundry list on the
way out the door. But as time passes, with probability λ from 1 s
to the next, attention will go vagrant. A different idea will occur
to the meditator; the doorknob will loose its ability to cue the
unfamiliar action to the professor. Then with probability α the
meditator’s attention will drift back to the object of veneration;
and the professor will underscore his mental note.
To know where the mind will be at any point in time, we oper-
ate the Markov model shown in Figure 4. This is accomplished by






1 − λ λ






The top row of P corresponds to being in A and the bottom
row ∼A, at the current time. The first column corresponds to
A at the next time-step, and the second column corresponds
to ∼A at the next time step. Thus, if currently in A, the top
row, the individual will stay in A with probability 1–λ; but he
will lapse to ∼A with probability λ. If in ∼A, he will recover
attention with probability α, and remain absent minded with
probability 1–α. To compute the presence or absence of mind-
edness after 1 time step, raise the matrix to the power 1, and
inspect the top left cell. That is what you see before you—the
exercise just completed. To compute the state after 2 time-steps,
square the matrix; and after n time steps, raise it to the nth power.
After enough time, no matter in which state the individual starts,
the probability of being present-minded—of staying on task, or
being sensitive to prospective memory cues that have been set—
converges to the value α/(α + λ). If starting from the A state,
there is a constant probability λ of loosing attention that, over
many trials, sees attention winking out according to a concave
function that resembles an exponential decay, falling to a floor
of α/(α + λ). If starting from the absent-minded state ∼A, there
is a complementary increase, to a ceiling of α/(α + λ).
Sometimes the very act of perceiving a rare stimulus on a
rapidly-paced task such as the SART will drive the subject into
an error-processing mode, during which time attention to sub-
sequent stimuli is affected. An illustration of this is provided
FIGURE 5 | The probability of an error (a positive response on a NOGO
trial) after a prior NOGO trial. The abscissae are trials since last NOGO
trial. The ordinates are the probability of making an error of commission,
conditional on whether the prior NOGO trial had occasioned an error (E|E),
or a correct withholding of the response (E|C). The data are from Cheyne
et al. (2009). The curves are from NEMA, under the assumption that a
NOGO trial immediately throws the subject into the ∼A state in order to
process the rare event, from which they return according to the parameters
of Table 3.
Table 3 | Parameters for the data from Cheyne et al. (2009).
α λ
CONDITION
Prior correct (E|C) 0.115 0.258
Prior error (E|E) 0.046 0.095
by the research of Cheyne et al. (2009) who conducted a SART
task with a large number of subjects, permitting the tracing of
errors as a function of the number of trials since the previous
rare event (a NOGO trial in the SART), when correctly (E|C) or
incorrectly (E|E) responded to on that prior trial. These data are
shown in Figure 5, along with the traces from Eq. (6). In order to
account for these data within the framework of NEMA, I had to
assume that the NOGO trial immediately sent the observer into
an inattentive processing mode (∼A) with greatly reduced sensi-
tivity to stimuli (i.e., blind to them). Individuals then returned
to attention from one trial to the next with the probabilities a
given by Table 3. Figure 5 shows the data, and the model results
from NEMA. In both cases, the curves converged on the same
asymptote, 32% probability of an error.
What this analysis shows is that, after a correct response on
the rare NOGO trial, participants were much quicker to return
to attention (α = 0.12) than after errors, on which they brooded
three times as long (α = 0.046), and which caused an inevitable
subsequent omission (see the Authors’ Figure 7). But after an
error, participants were much slower to lapse into an inattentive
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state (λ = 0.095) than after a correct inhibition. They were chas-
tened by their error. Presence in the inattentive state will both
slow responses and increase the probability of an omission of a
go response, a correlation shown by these authors’ Figure 4. The
authors of this study called these effects reactive mind wandering,
but perhaps a better name for it would be error processing.
SUMMARY
The parameters α and λ tell us the strength of attractor States A
and ∼A. To the extent that the former is larger than the latter, the
individual will remain attentive. Of course, against the cause of
A is the fact that there is seldom just one inattentive state; there
are many byways that beckon the mind off its highway, each with
fresh resources of energy to beguile. To maintain presence in state
A (as in vigilance tasks) or sensitivity to cues which will return
it to A (as in performance or prospective memory tasks) depletes
energetic resources. According to the neuroenergetics theory NeT,
many of these resources come from the astroglia that provide lac-
tate, either by relatively direct conversion of glucose to lactate, or
through the exploitation of stores of glycogen that astrocytes con-
tain. As energy stores deplete, the ability to stay in A, indexed by
1–λ, depletes with it, and lapses will therefore increase with time
on task. Processing of task-irrelevant stimuli is, of course, better
when attention is not so highly focused on task (Weissman et al.,
2009), and in some contexts this has survival value (Killeen et al.,
2012). Whether mind wandering is considered a feature or a bug
depends on context and outcome (McVay and Kane, 2010).
There are many threats to present-mindedness. Strong attrac-
tors may compete with attention to task, whether those are puz-
zling through a recondite scientific, logical or historic problem;
or are worries over finances, health, or relationships. Conversely,
attention may wander simply for lack of energy to maintain it in
State A. Poor sleep and general fatigue are notorious as threats
to attention, as deleterious to the maintenance of skilled per-
formance as is alcohol. It is during sleep, especially slow-wave
sleep, that the brain restores the astrocytes’ supplies of glycogen
(Benington and Heller, 1995). Without that “bench”, the neurons
quick depletion of energy cannot receive adequate resupply from
the astrocytes’ slower processing of capillary-derived glucose.
Stimulants such as amphetamine and methylphenidate help
maintain focus because, among other effects, they increase the
presence of noradrenaline, and they do so preferentially in areas
of the brain that are busy processing information, such as main-
taining working memory for intellectual tasks. In doing that, they
decrease the attractiveness of the fully energized other regions of
the brain, and their ability to subvert attention. Noradrenaline
stimulates the adrenoceptors of the astroglia, signaling them to
convert glycogen to lactate, which is then shuttled to the neurons.
When this system is derailed in any way, it takes focused atten-
tion with it. When brain glucose utilization was analyzed using
Positron Emission Tomography, methylphenidate decreased glu-
cose utilization in the parts of the brain that are associated with
mind-wandering (Volkow et al., 2008), consistent with the NeT.
One of the techniques used to maintain attention in individuals
with ADHD is fidgeting. That activity increases sympathetic tone,
andmay facilitate noradrenergic release of lactate from astrocytes.
It is interesting that it has recently been shown that such fid-
geting is predicted by measures of inattention and spontaneous
mind-wandering (Carriere et al., 2013).
Performance tasks such as the SARTmay deteriorate with time
on task because of such fatigue, without mediation by gross fail-
ures of attention. As seen in Figure 5, however, errors may cause
attention to be shifted to error correcting ruminations, caus-
ing increased probability of subsequent error. On slower-paced
continuous performance tasks, attention will wander without
the goad of error processing. Figure 4 and Eqs. (4–6) provide
a model of that process. Although a relatively simple model, to
adequately test its applicability to absent-mindedness will require
confrontation with detailed data sets from slowly paced tasks.
One evening as a graduate student, the physicist I. I. Rabbi con-
templated the enormous amount of tedious work he would have
to do to over the next months to complete his dissertation project.
Rather than start work, his mind wandered into fantasy and paths
of whimsy. By the end of the night he had sketched a new analysis,
and in just a few months had completed many times the research
required for his Ph.D. He called the approach he fantasized and
then invented “magnetic resonance” (Rigden, 1987). Mind wan-
dering, as in that case, is often a feature, rather than bug: Fantasy
is escapist, “and that is its glory. If a soldier is imprisoned by the
enemy, do not we consider it his duty to escape?. . . If we value the
freedom of mind and soul, if we are partisans of liberty, then it is
our plain duty to escape, and to take as many people with us as
we can!” (Tolkien, 1945). Perhaps not always though, especially if
suturing an aneurism or piloting a 737.
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